properties of the finite games? To what extent do these results depend on the regularity conditions given by A/S?
In this article we propose to discuss the non-emptiness of the core. Specifically, we show that under similar conditions (to those of A/S), the core of the finite games might well be empty. However, points based on a Lagrangian price vector will be almost in the core, in the sense that, for each coalition S, the excess will be not greater than some (relatively) small positive number.
The first thing we note is that the A/S theorem does not assume the production functions u i are concave. Now, if they were concave, there would be no problem. (We shall see more about this case below.) With nonconcave functions, the core for a finite game might well be empty. The following example, from (Shapley/Shubik 1966) , shows this: Example 1. As a trivial example of how the core may be empty, consider a game with only one resource (i. e., m = 1). Each of n players has an endowment a = ½. Each unit of the resource can be sold for $1; we equate utility with money. However, only full units can be sold; fractions left over have no value, so that u i (x) = [x] (where [x] is the greatest integer function) for each player i. The resulting game has the very simple characteristic function
where s is the cardinality of coalition S.
[We might interpret this as follows: the resource is wine; each player has ½ liter, in a plastic jug. Each player's "technology" consists of some liter bottles and a funnel, which allow him to "transform" the resource (wine in a plastic jug) into the market good (bottled wine), which can be sold at an exogenous price of $1 per bottle. There is a very rigorous state liquor authority which makes certain that consumers get their money's worth, so that it is impossible to sell bottles containing less than a full liter. Moreover, if the bottle contains more than a full liter, it can still be sold only for $ 1.] Now, if the number of players, n, is even, say n = 2k, the situation is quite simple. The resource has an equilibrium price of $1 per unit, and k of the players will sell their half unit to the other k players for 50¢. Now these latter sell their bottled wine on the open market for $1, thus netting 50¢ each. The resulting imputation (½, ½, …, ½) is clearly in the core of the game.
It is not difficult to see, however, that whenever n (the number of players) is odd (and at least 3), the core of the game must be empty. For, if n = 2k+1, then v(N) = k. The core conditions, however, require that each 2-player set receive at least $1, and this can only be achieved if there are n/2 = k+½ dollars available. Thus there is a deficit (we define this concept more rigorously below) of 50¢, and the core is empty. Note however that, as the number of players increases, the relative deficit, which can be (more or less) defined as ½ divided by v(N), and is thus approximately 1/n, goes to 0. In this sense, and in this sense only, we can say that in the limit there is a non-empty core.
(It may, of course, be objected that the production functions u i (x) are neither continuous nor slow-growth. However, the same results can be obtained with the slightly different function
which is certainly a slow-growth function. As to continuity and differentiability, it is easy to make small modifications in this function so as to obtain differentiability while preserving its essential character, which is that u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1, and u(x) < x for all other x. The core will then be empty for similar reasons.)
We proceed, then, to analyze the non-emptiness of the core. In our analysis, the following definition will play an important role: Definition 1. Let (v, N) be an n-person TU game in characteristic function form. Let µ(v, N) be the value of the program µ = minimum ∑ i∈N z i subject to ∑ i∈S z i ≥ v(S) for all S⊂N
The non-differentiable case a. The Mathematical Model
Analogously to A/S, we consider an n-person game (N, v) in characteristic function form, given by
where each a i (the endowment) is a vector in ℜ m + and each u i (the production function) is a mapping from ℜ m + into the reals. We define an allocation as an n-tuple X = [x 1 , …, x n ] of non-negative m-vectors. It is feasible if
The function v can be obtained by solving 2 n -1 maximization problems -one for each non-empty S⊂N. Obviously, even for mid-sized n, this is a tremendous amount of work. Nevertheless we can try to determine whether the core is empty. In fact, we shall prove below Theorem 4, which states, more or less, that:
Theorem: under certain reasonable conditions to be given below, the relative deficit of the game goes to 0 as the number of players goes to infinity.
We will assume a finite but growing number of players; i.e., new players will be brought into the game. These new players cannot be arbitrary, in the sense that their production functions u i and endowments a i must satisfy certain regularity conditions. We shall discuss later the conditions on these new players. For the moment, we assume a fixed game with n players and m resources. As in A/S, we assume all the production functions u i (x) are monotone increasing, with u i (0) = 0. (We do not assume differentiability in this section.) We will, moreover, make the following assumption 1:
For each i, there is a convex, compact polyhedral set Q i which has the property that, in all the maximization problems (1), the maximizing allotment x i can always be found in the set Q i .
[Remark: This restriction on the functions u i corresponds, more or less, to the "slow-growth" property given in A/S. Essentially, it says that there is no producer who is so efficient that -as new players come into the game -this one producer keeps on using more and more of the resources. The reason for this assumption is not quite obvious here, but it will help, below, in dealing with concavifications. ]
We will be particularly interested in the optimization problem corresponding to v(N), which we call Program A:
Note that with assumption 1, the constraint (A3) is not binding, in the sense that the solution obtained without regard to it will automatically satisfy (A3).
b. Concave functions and concavifications
Suppose, first, that the functions u i are concave. In that case, the objective function (A1), as the sum of concave functions, is concave. The constraint set is a convex polyhedron. Thus this is of the class of optimization problems considered "easy." As is well known (see, e.g., [Rockafellar 1970] ), the solution can be expressed in terms of Lagrange multipliers: there exists a vector of equilibrium prices
with the property that the maximum of program A is obtained by assigning to each player, i, an allotment x i o which maximizes the function
The corresponding allocation
gives the desired maximum. Moreover, the imputation q = (q 1, …, q n ) given by
will be in the core of the game.
[We interpret this as follows: the function g i represents the profits that player i's technology can afford him. In equilibrium, each player maximizes his profits, given the prices p j , and is moreover paid for his original endowment at these prices.] Suppose, however, that the functions u i are not concave. For each i, let û i be the concavification of u i , i. e., the smallest concave function which is not smaller than u i on all of its domain. We will obtain a new game, v', defined by
, and we find that this represents a "goal to shoot for:" if (in game v) some feasible allocation gives a total payoff of v'(N)-ε, then def(v, N) is not more than ε.
The two following definitions will prove useful:
Definition. We shall say that an allotment x is a true point of the concavification
Definition. The quantity
is the duality gap for u i . Since these functions are continuous, and Q i is compact, this maximum exists, and is finite, for all i. Let γ* be the largest of all the γ i .
The following two theorems, dealing with concavified functions, are important in our development. They are standard theorems of convex analysis.
Theorem 1 (Caratheodory and Krein/Milman). Let u be a continuous function defined over a compact convex subset Q of ℜ m + , and let û be its concavification. Let x o be a virtual point of û. Then there exists a set of β (where β ≤ m+1) true points y h and β real numbers r h (h = 1, 2, …, β) such that
Theorem 2. Let y h (h = 1, 2, …, β) be the β points determined by the virtual point x o in accordance with Theorem 1. Suppose z is another convex combination of the y h ; i. e., suppose there exist real numbers s h such that
Remark 2: Note that in Theorem 1, the numbers r h are positive; in Theorem 2, the numbers s h are merely assumed non-negative.
c. Three modified optimization problems
We now consider the modified (i.e., concavified) optimization problem, which we call Program B:
We note, first of all, that Programs A and B, having the same constraint sets, differ only in their objective functions. Thus the solution of each is a feasible point for the other. Let, then X* = [x 1 *, …, x n *] be the solution (maximizing allocation) for Program A, and let
and it follows that
Thus, if all the allotments x i o were true points of the corresponding functions, the deficit would be zero; i.e., the core would be non-empty. In fact we can't count on such good luck; we must therefore take a closer look at those allotments that are virtual points.
Suppose x i o is, in fact, a virtual point of the function û i . Then there exist β i true points y i h (h = 1, 2, …, β i ) related to x i o as explained in Theorem 1. In case x i o is a true point of û i ,, we set β i = 1 and there is a single point, y i 1 = x i o , corresponding to this theorem. Note that, in any case, all y i h ∈ Q i . These points y i h will be fixed from now on (until the end of this section).
Consider, now, Program C:
Note the difference between Program B and Program C. In C, the allotments are restricted to convex linear combinations of the corresponding y i h . On the other hand, the B3 and B4 have been removed. Since, however, all the points y i h ∈ Q i , constraints C3, C4 and C5 imply B3 and B4. Thus the constraint set for C is a subset of that for B, and so the maximum of C cannot be greater than that for B. On the other hand, the maximizing allocation for B satisfies the constraints of C, and must thus be the X-part of a solution for C. Conversely, since this means that the maximum is the same for both programs, it will follow that the X-part of any solution for C is also a solution for B.
We now apply Theorem 2: for any z i satisfying C3 and C4, the relation
Consider then Program D:
As may be seen, Program D is merely Program C with the explicit presence of the allotments z i removed. Thus the solution for Program D is merely the s-part of a solution for C. From this solution (for D), moreover, a solution for B will be obtained by use of the relations C3. Thus, we may in fact assume that Program B has a solution of this type.
Note, moreover, that, since the y i h are fixed, Program D is in fact a linear program. Thus, a solution (s ih o ) can always be found at an extreme point of the constraint set. Now, at an extreme point of a linear program, the number of non-zero variables is not more than the number of constraints (not counting non-negativity constraints). As can be seen, D2 represents m constraints, while D3 represents n constraints. Thus there is a solution with not more than m+n non-zero variables s ih o . We will assume that the allocation Thus, in inequality (1.7), which was given above and is repeated here:
the right-hand side contains at most m non-zero terms. Now, none of these terms can be greater than γ*, and so we find that we have proved Theorem 3. Under the assumptions above, in a game with m resources and any number of players, and a maximal duality gap γ* for the production functions u i ,
Remark 4. In [Aubin and Ekeland 1976 ] a similar result is obtained by the use of the Shapley/Folkman theorem, which states, more or less, that a sum of points from the convex hulls of m-dimensional sets can always be reexpressed so that all but m+1 of the points come from the sets themselves as opposed to the convex hulls. We have given a slightly different proof, not because mγ* < (m+1)γ* (which though true is a trivial improvement), but because the intermediate result (Theorem 1 above) will be used in proving Theorem 5 below (in the next section).
d. Assumptions on new players.
We will now assume that new players are brought into the game, subject to the following conditions. Assumption 2. There is a constant γ* such that, for all players i brought into the game, the duality gap γ i ≤ γ*. Assumption 3. As n → ∞, so also v(N) → ∞.
Note that we do not require "replication of a profile" as in Shapley/Shubik (1966) . We merely assume new players are not terribly different (neither much "larger" nor much "smaller") from old players.
With these two assumptions, we can now give a final theorem: Theorem 4. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the relative deficit goes to 0 as n → ∞. Proof: By theorem 3, the (absolute) deficit is not greater than mγ*. Therefore
By Assumption 2, the numerator mγ* is constant. By Assumption 3, the denominator v(N) grows without bound. Thus rdf → 0. In this sense, we can say that the core is relatively non-empty in the limit.
Note: Essentially, this says that the weak ε-core is non-empty.
The Differentiable case a. The modified counterexample
In discussing Example 1 (Section 1, above) it was pointed out that, even if the production functions u i are modified to be differentiable, the core of the game will be non-empty for odd values of n. In fact, while this is true, it turns out that differentiablity makes a substantial difference. Consider the following modification of Example 1: Example 2. Each of n players has an endowment a = ½ unit of the good. All players have the same production function, u(x). We will assume that u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1, and that u(x) < x for all other x. In this example, however, the function u is assumed differentiable. Since u(x) -x assumes its maximum value (which is zero) at x = 1, it will follow that the derivative u'(1) = 1.
It is easily checked that, for this game, µ(v, N) = n/2 (so long as n ≥ 2). As in Example 1, there will be no difficulty if n (the number of players) is even, say n = 2k. In fact, in that case, k of the players will sell their endowment to the other k at the equilibrium price of $1 per unit. The buyers will then produce goods worth k dollars in all, so that each player will receive 50¢. This payoff vector will be in the core.
Suppose, as before, that n = 2k+1. In that case, the equilibrium price still has to be $1 per unit of resource, and µ = k+½. However, it is impossible to obtain a total of k+½ dollars, since production can only reach this efficient level when each producer uses either 0 or 1 units of resource. Thus the core is necessarily empty.
Consider, however, the following scenario. Suppose k of the players sell their endowment to another k. This will give us the allocation X:
The total production, ∑u(x i ), will then be k+ u(½). Now, since µ = k + ½ dollars, there is a deficit of
dollars. Since all we know about the function u is that it is monotone and differentiable, this deficit could be as much as 50¢. Thus the situation here is much as in the previous counterexample. The allocation X is not, however, the best that can be done. In fact, we shall see that, as n grows without bound, a different allocation will yield arbitrarily small deficits.
Since u'(1) = 1, it will follow that (2.1)
where the error term, e(t), satisfies (2.2) lim t→0 e(t)/t = 0.
Given an arbitrary ε > 0, then, choose δ > 0 small enough that |e(t)/t| < ε whenever |t| < δ. Let now n = 2k+1, where 1/(2k) < δ, and consider the allocation Y:
Thus, the ½ unit held by the inefficient producer (player 2k+1 in allocation x) is divided equally among the k efficient producers. Total production will then be ∑u(y i ) = k u(1 + 1/(2k)). Now, we have, by (1), u(1+ 1/(2k)) = 1 + 1/(2k) -e(1/(2k)) and so ∑u(y i ) = k + ½ -ke(1/(2k)). Since 1/ 2k < δ, we have ke(1/(2k)) ≤ 2ke(1/(2k)) = e(1/(2k)) / (1/(2k)) < ε, and it follows that
Thus, with large enough n and allocation Y, the absolute deficit (not just the relative deficit) can be made smaller than any preassigned ε > 0.
In discussing the example above, the role played by differentiability is obvious, since in the nondifferentiable case the absolute deficit does not decrease. Not so obvious, but also important, is the fact that all players have the same production function u. Specifically, it is the fact that the value of δ necessary for the condition |e(δ)/δ| < ε to hold is the same for all players. If the players have different production functions, then it is possible that, for some ε, the necessary δ might decrease rapidly for newly included players. In that case, the argument used in this example would not hold.
b. The new model
Let us, therefore, consider the same maximization problem (A) that was discussed in Section 1, above. We will make the additional assumption that all the functions u i are continuously differentiable and that, moreover, they are effectively bounded: there exists K such that allotments x with norm || x || > K are never efficient. Let Q be the subset of ℜ m + consisting of all non-negative x such that ||x|| ≤ 2K.
In this case we prove below Theorem 5, which states, more or less:
Theorem: Under certain reasonable conditions (to be discussed below), the absolute deficit goes to 0 as the number of players goes to infinity.
As in Section 1, we will proceed to solve the modified (concavified) problem (B). As discussed above, the solution of the modified problem (B) can be characterized in terms of terms of dual variables, i.e., an equilibrium price vector p = (p 1, p 2 , …, p m ). We assume this price vector p has been found. Now, in the maximizing allocation, each allotment x i maximizes the profit function
Let the maximizing allocation be
, and let M be the value of this program:
(This is the same quantity we had called v'(N) in Section 1 above.) Once again, this M represents a "goal to shoot for" in the sense that, if we can obtain this amount of utility, then the imputation (q 1 , …, q n ), where
(the sum of whose components is M) will be in the core of the game. The problem, then, lies in the fact thatsince some of the vectors x i o might be virtual rather than true points -this M is not always available; there is a deficit which might be as much as
Since the functions u i are continuously differentiable, all the partial derivatives u ij = ∂u i /∂x j are uniformly continuous over the compact set Q. Since there is only a finite number of these derivatives, they are uniformly equi-continuous; i.e., given any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, if ||x-y|| < δ (and both x and y∈Q) then, for all i and j, |u ij (x)-u ij (y)| < ε.
Consider the maximizing allocation
. From Section 1, we know that we can assume that at most m of the vectors x i o are virtual points of the corresponding û i ; the remaining n-m (or more) must all be true points. Moreover, by Theorem 1, each of these virtual points x i o can be expressed as a convex linear combination of (not more than) m+1 true points y i h :
(2.10)
where, for each i,
Since ∑ h r ih = 1, and all r ih > 0, g i (x i o ) cannot be greater than the largest of the g i (y i h ). But in fact we know that x i o maximizes the function g i . Thus at least one of the y i h also maximizes g i . (In fact, all of the y i h maximize this function, though that requires a slightly more subtle argument.) In any case, we see that there is, for each i, at least one true y that maximizes the function g i . We will therefore consider the allocation
(2.12)
Since all the vectors y i o maximize the corresponding functions g i , the allocation Y o is almost a solution to the concavified program. Since they are all true points, moreover, they almost give a solution, with deficit zero, to the original program (A). Unfortunately, this might not be a feasible allocation since, in general, the sum of the allotments will not be equal to the sum of the endowments.
We know, since X o is the solution to problem (B), that
is also given by (2.14)
Note that, in this last expression, the sum on the right-hand side contains at most m non-zero terms: those for which x i o is a virtual point of û i . Now, all the vectors x i o and y i o have norm K or smaller. Thus
Note also that, since all components of all these vectors are non-negative, and smaller than or equal to K, then, for each j,
It will be necessary to distribute this w among the n players of the game. What we will prove is that this can be done in a way that gives "almost" the desired total utility M.
We mentioned above that both x i o and y i o maximize the function g i . It follows that g i (
. Using this, and the fact that the y i o are true points, so that u i (y i o ) = û i (y i o ), we find that
Adding over all i,
Interchanging the order of summation, and using the definitions (4) of M and (14) of w, this reduces to
Thus, we have a deficit not greater than the amount ∑ j p j w j .
c. Behavior as n Increases
We will now assume that the number of players, n, increases without bound. This cannot, however, be done arbitrarily: we must put certain conditions on the production functions u i as well as on the endowments a i of the new players. Essentially, we assume that the "new" players are not very different from the "old" players. (Note: these are essentially conditions on what [Wooders, 1992] calls the pre-game.) Thus Assumption 4. There is a constant K large enough that, as new players enter the game, allotments x i of norm greater than K are never efficient. (This K can be assumed greater than 1.) Assumption 5. As n → ∞, the sum ∑ i∈N a ij → ∞ for all j.
Assumption 6. Letting Q be the compact set in ℜ m consisting of non-negative vectors of norm not greater than 2K, all partial derivatives u ij are uniformly equi-continuous in Q.
We can now state the principal result of this section:
Theorem 5. Let ε > 0. Suppose assumptions 4, 5 and 6, above, hold. Then, for sufficiently large n, there is a feasible allocation Y' = [y i '] such that
Proof.
Since the proof is somewhat long, we divide it into four parts: By Assumption 6, there exists δ > 0 such that, if ||x-y|| < δ (and both x and y∈Q) then, for all i and j,
This δ can be assumed smaller than 1.
By Assumption 5, we can now choose n sufficiently large that, for each j, We know, by (16), (and Assumption 4) that |w j | < mK. Now, by (13),
Since K > 1, and δ < 1, this means ∑ k y kj o > 0. Thus the y ij ' are well defined by (21) (i.e., there is no division by zero there).
Also from (13), we see that
and so
Since y ij o ≥ 0, it follows that (2.25)
(iii) We show that Y' is feasible: the sum of the allotments is equal to the sum of the endowments.
For each j, from (21),
Thus, from (13),
We see then that Y' is a feasible allocation.
(iv) We show that Y' gives a deficit smaller than ε.
Since the functions u i are differentiable, 
Now, by (19), we see that, for each i and j,
Summing with respect to i, we see that, for each j,
Note, however, that, by (28), for any one value of j, all non-zero ∆ ij have the same sign. Thus
Since each y i o maximizes the function g i , it follows that, for each i and j such that y ij o > 0,
But, by (28), ∆ ij = 0 whenever y ij o = 0, and so Summing now with respect to j,
Interchanging the order of summation, and using the fact that there are only m values of j in this sum,
Now, from (32),
But this, together with (18), gives us (2.37) ∑ i u i (y i ') > M -ε as desired.
Thus we see that, as n →∞, the deficit will be smaller than any arbitrary positive ε. In this sense, we can say that the core is absolutely non-empty in the limit.
d. Interpretation of the regularity assumptions
The regularity assumptions mentioned above may seem somewhat strange at first. However, they are in the spirit of not allowing any of the players to be "much larger" than the others. (In other articles, the assumption is that new players replicate the old, which is a much stronger condition.)
The reader conversant with probability theory might compare this with the conditions which are needed for, say, the central limit theorem or even for the law of large numbers: for the case of non-identically distributed random variables, these laws cannot be expected to hold unless some conditions are placed. For example, one frequently seen condition, dealing with the several summands, requires that the sum of the variances and the sum of their reciprocals both diverge.
In a similar way, our assumption 4 says, essentially, that no player is so rich, or so efficient, that he can handle more than a certain amount K of resources. One thing we want to rule out, for example, is successively larger and more efficient trios of players -with each trio playing a larger-scale version of the game in Example 2. This condition is similar to the condition found in [Wooders, 1983 [Wooders, , 1992 which she calls small group effectiveness.
On the other hand, assumption 5 states that the newly arriving players continue to contribute to the total sum of resources in a non-negligible amount -so that no player will, in the long run, have more than a negligible portion of any of the resources. Obviously, no convergence would be obtained if, for example, the new players were simply an infinity of dummies, with no endowment and no production functions.
Finally, assumption 6 in effect guarantees that the continuous differentiability of the several functions u i is (in some way) preserved in the limit. If this does not happen, then, effectively, differentiability is lost as n grows. This is to be avoided.
